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Abstract 
 
In the current study, we explored the effect of risk-assessment testimony, attributional 
complexity, and victim type on participants’ perceptions of the dangerousness of a 
sexually violent person and his need for treatment.  Participants read details of a hypo-
thetical sexual assault of a female minor and of an adult.  Expert testimony of his risk 
assessment consisted of clinical opinion versus structured-clinical judgment (SCJ) 
versus actuarial assessment.  Participants perceived clinical-opinion and SCJ testimony 
as equally influential when forming judgments of future dangerousness.  In the context 
of treatment, however, participants relied on actuarial testimony when judging potential 
for risk.  In addition, attributional complexity (AC) moderated perceptions of sexual risk.  
Overall, results point to the need for continued refinement of assessment techniques 
when determining dangerousness and need for treatment. 
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Overview 
 
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled that mental-health experts could testify 
regarding the perceived dangerousness of a defendant (Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983).  
Since this ruling, testimony addressing violence-risk assessment has generally been 
presented in the form of clinical opinion, i.e., based on a clinician’s experience as a 
practicing psychologist, without the use of standardized assessment instruments (Harris 
& Lurigio, 2007).  Recently, however, concern has emerged over the ability of clinical 
opinion alone to accurately assess risk of violence (e.g., see Monahan, 2003).  This 
concern has led to the development of various assessment tools and techniques in 
search of the best method for assessing risk.  The methods currently utilized to assess 
risk include: clinical opinion; actuarial instruments, which attach a specific statistical 
weight to each factor assessing risk (Webster, Müller-Isberner, & Fransson 2002); and 
structured-clinical judgment (SCJ), which integrates clinical judgment with risk-
assessment tools (Boer, Wilson, Gauthier & Hart, 1997; Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & 
Slobogin, 2007; Murray & Thomson, 2010).  In the current study, we examined the 
differential impact of risk-assessment testimony consisting of clinical opinion, structured-
clinical judgment, and the use of actuarial instruments on perceptions of a person’s 
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need for treatment and future dangerousness1 in the context of a sexual assault of a 
female (adult versus minor) victim.  In addition, we investigated the role of attributional 
complexity—the ability to utilize complex attributional schemata—when evaluating 
expert testimony and case facts (Fletcher, Danilovics, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986).  
Finally, we explored the role of gender in light of the recent emergence of participant 
gender as an important variable In "Sexually Violent Person" (SVP) trials (McCabe, 
Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006).  
 
Background 
 
Over the last fifty years, states have evolved laws specifically directed towards criminals 
who commit sexual crimes (Becker & Murphy, 1998).  These SVP statutes have 
outlined the framework for a finding of “sexual dangerousness,” which allows for the 
containment of sexual offenders in treatment facilities upon release from prison.  These 
types of laws, as well as those that establish community-warning programs, have been 
enacted in 20 states (Boccaccini, Murrie, Hawes, Simpler, & Johnson, 2010; Fitch & 
Hammen, 2002; Gookin, 2007; In re Young, 1993).  Although each jurisdiction defines 
“sexually violent” somewhat differently, all SVP laws require the individual to possess 
both a mental abnormality and the potential of future risk of re-offense (Schwartz, 1999).  
In many instances, definitions of mental abnormality require the individual to have a 
diagnosable mental disorder listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the APA, such 
as paraphilia, or other disorders that increase likelihood of sexual recidivism (Becker & 
Murphy, 1998). 
 
Throughout the years, a growing number of cases involving the commitment of SVPs 
have been challenged, as in the case of Leroy Hendricks (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997).  
Hendricks had been imprisoned for repeatedly molesting children.  When he was 
scheduled for release, the state of Kansas sought to commit him under the Kansas SVP 
Act.  The Kansas SVP Act allows for the civil commitment of an offender if the presence 
of a mental abnormality or personality disorder renders it likely the individual would re-
offend.  Hendricks appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld his 
confinement.  The Court ruled that a sexual offender committed to a treatment facility 
could be held beyond his sentence without violating his Fifth-Amendment rights.  Most 
states following the Kansas law have identified the following criteria necessary for 
consideration prior to committing a sexual offender: a history of sexual offending, the 
presence of a mental abnormality, an inability to control his or her actions and a 
significant risk for sexual offending in the future (Boccaccini, Murrie, Caperton, & 
Hawes, 2009).  
 
In 2002, however, the Supreme Court revisited the “mental abnormality” consideration 
required by the Kansas statute in Kansas v. Crane.  Specifically, the state of Kansas 
sought to have Crane placed in a treatment facility even though he did not meet the 
criteria for mental illness as defined by the State.  The Court ruled that the Kansas SVP 
law could be applied to defendants not experiencing significant impairment or total lack 
of control over their actions.  This ruling allowed a broader application for SVP 
                                            
1In the current study, the term future dangerousness is used synonymously with continued threat. 
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commitment than civil-commitment laws with respect to the mentally ill.  Currently, 14 of 
20 states allowing the involuntary commitment of sexually dangerous persons permit 
the right to a jury trial to assess the dangerousness of the defendant (Rush & Gransee, 
2010).  With over 4,500 individuals confined under current commitment laws, there is a 
high demand for accurate methods to assess dangerousness in sexually violent 
offenders (Sbraga, 2004). 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
Dynamic v. Static Factors.  Expert testimony addressing violent and sexual recidivism 
typically relies on risk factors associated with the offender and the offense.  These risk 
factors are commonly divided into two groups: static and dynamic (Conroy, 2003; Han-
son & Bussiere 1998; Hanson & Harris, 2000).  Static risk factors are defined as fixed or 
historical characteristics of an offender, such as offender age, offense history, age at 
first offense, and victim characteristics.  Conversely, dynamic risk factors are identified 
as characteristics that can change over time, such as anger control methods, substance 
abuse, and social networks.  Dynamic risk factors are divided into two subgroups: stable 
and acute.  Stable factors should remain relatively unchanged, whereas acute dynamic 
factors can change rapidly.  Sex-offender recidivism has been associated with stable 
dynamic factors such as positive social support, deviant sexual interests, use of alcohol 
and illegal substances, and victim access (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Hanson & Harris, 
2000; 2001).  Acute dynamic factors include intoxication and sexual arousal.  Research 
addressing the predictive utility of dynamic and static risk factors reveals important yet 
disparate findings.  For example, results of a meta-analysis conducted by Hanson and 
Bussiere (1998), found that static risk factors were the best predictors of long-term re-
cidivism.  On the other hand, research finds identifying dynamic risk factors most useful 
in predicting future violence (Conroy, 2003).  Research concerning the ability of dynam-
ic factors to predict sexual recidivism reveals inconsistent findings, with some studies 
demonstrating that dynamic factors are good predictors of sexual recidivism while oth-
ers find that dynamic risk factors can predict general criminal recidivism but not sexual 
recidivism (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; Hanson & Harris, 2000; Hanson, Scott, & 
Steffy, 1995; Lindsey, Elliot, & Astell, 2004).  Hanson and Harris (2000) found that vic-
tim access, anger, and unwillingness to cooperate with individuals in author-
ity/supervisory positions were the most reliable predictors of recidivism.  This assess-
ment was made among the acute factors studied by the researchers, explaining, “most 
of the factors that were stable risk factors were also acute risk predictors” (p. 23).  Re-
gardless of the label allocated to these factors, assessment of sex-offender recidivism 
should include both static and dynamic factors.  
 
Expert Testimony.  Although increasing numbers of clinicians are offering testimony 
regarding violence-risk assessment, there is considerable debate regarding the accu-
racy of the various methods used to determine potential for risk (see Murray & Thom-
son, 2010 for a review).  That said, the methods currently utilized to assess risk include: 
clinical opinion; actuarial instruments, which attach a specific statistical weight to each 
factor assessing risk; and structured-clinical judgment, which combines the use of as-
sessment tools with clinical judgment (Melton, et al., 2007; Murray & Thomson, 2010; 
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Webster, 2002).  Each method’s strengths and weaknesses have been thoroughly re-
viewed with respect their ability to assess potential for risk. 
 
Clinical opinion.  Clinical-opinion testimony, sometimes known as unstructured-clinical 
judgment/opinion, is the evaluation of an individual without the explicit use of risk factors 
or other tools.  In clinical-opinion testimony, the determination of a defendant’s 
dangerousness is made at the discretion of the expert (Dempster, 2003; Hanson, 1998).  
According to research (Elbogen & Huss, 2000), the context in which the evaluation is 
made may often affect the type of risk factors considered.  In terms of the clinical 
interview, this suggests a reliance on salient cues (e.g., delusions) when assessing risk 
(Quinsey, 1995).  Other researchers have found that clinicians base their 
recommendations on a history of violence, alcohol use, and level of anger more often 
than cues (Menzies & Webster, 1995).  Supporters of this assessment method contend 
that its greatest strength is the freedom it allows evaluators, who can tailor each 
assessment to the individual (Dolan & Doyle, 2000).  The clinical-opinion method has 
been heavily criticized, however, for such factors as ignoring base-rate data, assigning 
too much power to certain factors while ignoring others, the lack of rules or criteria 
governing the decision making, susceptibility to attributional errors, poor interrater 
reliability, and low accuracy and consistency (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Grove & Meehl, 
1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Hanson, 2009; Hanson, 2002; 
Krauss, Lieberman, & Olson, 2004).  Others have claimed that clinical opinion is no 
more accurate than the judgments of intelligent laypersons (Quinsey & Ambtman, 
1979).  
 
Actuarial instruments.  Actuarial assessment relies on the use of actuarial instruments 
in predicting future dangerousness (Hanson, 2002).  These instruments evaluate an 
offender on a number of static factors, and are then combined into a total score.  The 
score yields a determination of risk labeled as “low,” “moderate,” or “high” (Douglas & 
Skeem, 2005).  The guidelines for determining risk are often very specific, offering little 
clinical interpretation (Yang, Wong, & Coid, 2010).  Actuarial instruments have been 
slated as the most cost-effective manner of risk assessment (Beech, Fisher, & 
Thornton, 2003).  Although actuarial assessments are viewed by some as superior to 
clinical opinion (Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998), there is still a great deal of 
debate over their use in cases involving SVPs.  In fact, predominant criticisms include 
the inability of actuarial instruments to accurately illustrate a specific individual’s amount 
of risk.  Thus, overreliance on actuarial instruments may lead evaluators to ignore other 
factors of risk and the failure to provide recommendations for treatment objectives 
(Beech, et al., 2003).  
 
Structured-clinical judgment.  Structured-clinical-judgment testimony (SCJ), also 
referred to as guided-professional-judgment (GPJ) testimony, was developed to 
combine the expertise of clinical professionals with particular aspects of actuarial 
measures (Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, & Lehoux, 2007).  These judgments are based 
on empirically derived risk factors as well as clinical opinion regarding the defendant’s 
presentation of these risk factors (Dempster, 2003; Dolan & Doyle, 2000).  The Sexual 
Violence Risk-20-R (SVR-20-R) (Boer, Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997) is the most widely 
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used statistical tool utilized in this assessment method.  The SVR-20-R measures future 
risk potential of sexual offenses and has been found to be one of the few predictive 
measures that not only predict future violence, but also sexual recidivism (Dempster & 
Hart, 2002).  This method allows some freedom in judgment while still adhering to 
guidelines that aid in accuracy.  Following this method, clinicians examine both static 
and dynamic factors, with emphasis on dynamic factors.  Risk factors are evaluated with 
respect to the individual as opposed to the population of sex offenders (Dempster, 
2003; Douglas & Skeem, 2005).  Structured-clinical judgment has also been shown to 
be accurate and reliable (Dempster, 2003).  Recent research finds increasing support 
for the structured-clinical-judgment model in assessing risk of violence (Maden, 2005; 
Singh, 2008).  For example, field data examined on 107 Danish patients five years after 
discharge from forensic/psychiatric settings indicate that the structured-professional-
judgment model of risk assessment utilizing the Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20 
scale (HCR-20) had the highest predictive accuracy of violent recidivism for future 
violence compared to utilizing the HCR-20 solely in an actuarial manner (Pedersen, 
Rasmussen, & Elsass, 2010).  
 
Perceptions of Assessment Testimony 
 
Results of empirical studies investigating the impact of different types of expert 
testimony assessing risk of violence have demonstrated less clear-cut findings than 
data obtained in the aforementioned field study.  For example, in a recent study 
investigating the effect of the type of testimony on determinations of future 
dangerousness, researchers found higher levels of verdict confidence among 
venirepersons exposed to clinical opinion than among those exposed to actuarial 
testimony (Krauss, McCabe, & Lieberman, 2011).  In addition, contrary to the 
researchers’ predictions, rational information processors exposed to clinical testimony 
reported greater verdict confidence than those exposed to actuarial testimony.  
Experiential processors on the other hand, reported greater verdict confidence after 
hearing actuarial testimony than those who heard clinical testimony.  In an earlier study 
on a sample of undergraduate students, researchers observed this effect in the 
predicted direction, however, only after individuals were encouraged to think rationally 
(Lieberman, et al., 2007).  Namely, participant-jurors instructed to think about the case 
rationally were significantly more influenced by actuarial testimony than by clinical and 
guided-professional judgment (GPJ) testimony.  Alternatively, experiential processors 
reported higher levels of perceived defendant dangerousness when exposed to clinical 
testimony.  However, this effect was seen only for male participants.  It was interesting 
that, regardless of processing mode, participants did not differentiate between GPJ and 
clinical testimony on ratings of dangerousness.  This study appears to be the first to 
examine the differential effects of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and structured-clinical 
judgment testimony on evaluations of SVPs in the context of civil commitment.  
 
Guy and Edens (2003) examined the effect of different types of expert-witness 
testimony (clinical-opinion testimony versus actuarial-assessment testimony) and the 
expert's assessment of the defendant (no ‘psychopath’ label versus the label of 
‘psychopath’) on participants’ perceptions of the defendant's dangerousness in a mock 
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SVP commitment hearing.  In this study, participants were more likely to believe a 
defendant would commit future sexual violence if labeled a high-risk psychopath.  This 
effect was more pronounced for females than for males.  Namely, females were more 
likely to favor commitment than males were, particularly when the defendant was 
described as a psychopath.  It is interesting that the researchers did not observe a 
difference between the clinical and actuarial conditions.  This finding differed from a 
previous study examining differences between clinical and actuarial assessment 
testimony in the context of a capital trial (Krauss & Sales, 2001).  In this study, clinical-
opinion testimony was perceived as more accurate and more reliable than actuarial 
instruments in evaluating future dangerousness.  Clinical-opinion testimony was also 
rated more favorably among participant-jurors than was actuarial-expert testimony.  
Krauss and colleagues (2010) found notable differences in perceptions of aspects of an 
SVP trial between a sample of undergraduate students and jury-eligible community 
members.  Community members were more confident in their decision to commit.  
Commitment decisions for this group were also influenced by clinical-opinion testimony 
compared to actuarial testimony.  Students, on other hand, were influenced more by 
actuarial testimony than by clinical testimony, which the researchers attributed to the 
rational cognitive processing style of students. 
 
In 2006, Guy and Edens examined the role of victim type in the context of an SVP trial.  
In two separate sexual-assault scenarios, the researchers manipulated the age of the 
female victim as being 8 or 10 years old or 20 or 27 years old.  In addition, they 
examined the effect that the type of testimony (clinical opinion versus actuarial 
testimony) and the presence of the “psychopath” label had on participants’ assessment.  
Results indicated that, regardless of the type of testimony, participants overwhelmingly 
decided in favor of commitment in the child-victim condition.  This finding was consistent 
for both male and female participants.  In light of this finding, the researchers suggest 
future studies examine other aspects of a sexual-assault scenario (e.g., victim gender, 
level of seriousness of assault).  
 
Attribution and Decision Making 
 
Attribution theory.  Attribution theory examines the relation between individuals’ 
thoughts and behaviors and their interpretation of surrounding events (Heider, 1958).  
Accordingly, attribution theory has offered a new perspective in understanding research 
in the legal/forensic decision-making context.  Specifically, results of studies 
investigating the role of attribution in this context have increased awareness of the 
importance of individual difference characteristics in the legal/forensic arena.  Early 
research in this area uncovered a relationship between internal attributions and parole 
decisions (Carroll, 1978).  In this study, the researcher found that parole-board 
decisions were significantly more influenced by attributions based on the parolee’s 
internal characteristics than by case-specific factors.  In a follow-up study, the 
researcher found that members of a parole board were less likely to grant parole to 
offenders whose crimes were attributed to internal factors than to external factors 
(Carroll, 1979).  Supporting this finding, Cullen, Clark, Cullen, and Mathers (1985) 
demonstrated that individuals were more likely to favor rehabilitation over punishment if 
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an offender's crimes were linked to external factors rather than to internal attributions.  
In a later study, researchers found a strong relationship among causal attributions, juror 
attitudes, and sentencing decisions (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987).  
Results indicated that participants assigning internal attributions to verdicts of guilt also 
assigned harsher sentences than did participants allocating external attributions to guilty 
verdicts.  A recent study addressed attribution as a key moderator in understanding 
decision making in the context of a hate crime (Cramer, Chandler, & Wakeman, 2010).  
These researchers found a relation between blame attribution and punitiveness in a 
series of studies addressing perceptions of sexually oriented hate crimes with greater 
victim blame associated with less punitive punishment for the defendant.  When 
examining mock-jury deliberations in a capital case involving child abuse, Stevenson, 
Bottoms, and Diamond (2010) found participant-jurors’ use of stable attributions to 
conceptualize the defendant’s behavior strongly indicative of pro-prosecution sentiment.  
Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard, Smalley, and Schipperman (1985) found similar results in the 
context of a civil trial.  In this study, anti-plaintiff bias appeared to be guided by 
perceptions of negative stereotypes and hostile intentions rather than stable attributions.  
 
Attributional complexity.  In 1986, researchers conceptualized the construct of 
attributional complexity (Fletcher, et al., 1986).  They reasoned that individuals differ 
both in their preference for how to explain behavior and in their motivation to do so.  
These differences are the result of how we respond to and evaluate information as a 
function of our attributional schemata, with some individuals organizing and interpreting 
stimuli at a higher, more detailed level than others.  To measure this concept of 
“attributional complexity” Fletcher and colleagues (1986) created the Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS).  The 28-item scale assesses attributional complexity across 
seven factors or constructs: 
• level of interest/motivation 
• preference for complex rather than simple explanations 
• presence of metacognition concerning explanations 
• behavior as a function of interaction with others 
• tendency to infer abstract/complex internal attributions 
• tendency to infer contemporary external attributions 
• tendency to infer external causes from past experiences.   
The idea is that individuals who are more (less) complex on one “attributional 
dimension” will be more (less) complex on the other dimensions (p. 876-877).  
 
Research has demonstrated that individual differences in attributional complexity 
influence judgments and decision-making.  For example, high levels of AC have been 
found to be associated with high levels of perspective taking and empathic concern 
(Joireman, 2004).  Alternatively, low levels of AC have been related to endorsing 
punitive rather than rehabilitation models as well as perceptions of subtle racism (Reid 
& Foels, 2010; Tam, Au, & Leung, 2008).  In addition, individuals with relatively complex 
attributional schemata have been found to spend a considerable amount of time 
reflecting on more cognitively challenging problems rather than on less challenging 
ones (Fletcher, Rosanowski, Rhodes, & Lange, 1992).  High AC individuals also use 
this reflection time wisely—forming more accurate judgments not only in solving 
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complex discrimination tasks but also in accurately determining the personality 
characteristics of others (Fletcher, Reeder, & Bull, 1990).  Finally, attributionally 
complex individuals are selective regarding the criteria they use to form attributions.  
They select not only more information but also more useful information in analyzing 
causal attributions than attributionally simple individuals do (Murphy, 1994).  
 
Attributional complexity has also been shown to influence various aspects of legal 
decision-making.  In the context of a simulated armed robbery, Pope and Meyer (1999) 
found that attributionally complex jurors were significantly more likely to consider 
external factors for the defendant’s behavior than attributionally simple jurors were.  In 
addition, Pope and Meyer found gender differences with respect to such measures as 
verdict, confidence, and witness credibility.  Compared to females, male participants 
were significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty, report more confidence in their 
verdict preference, and view the eyewitness as more credible.  It is interesting that 
these researchers included an attributionally average group in addition to high and low 
AC groups.  While results indicated this group’s tendency to interpret the evidence in 
much the same manner as the high AC group, they appeared to distinguish themselves 
as a separate group based on the seven subscales of the ACS.  In a rather interesting 
experimental setting, Lassiter and colleagues (2005) examined the moderating effects 
of AC on susceptibility to camera perspective bias in the context of a videotaped 
“confession.  Although they observed differences2 in verdict as a function of attributional 
complexity, attributionally simple and attributionally complex participants did not differ 
with respect to their assessments of the voluntariness of a confession as measured by 
camera perspective.  The authors account for this finding by suggesting a different type 
of information processing involved in assessing camera perspective bias compared to 
verdict determinations.  Nonetheless, this study as well as others provides important 
insights into the moderating effects of attributional complexity in a broad range of legal 
and clinical circumstances. 
 
The Present Study 
 
Currently, only one study has empirically examined perceptions of the relative efficacy 
of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and guided-professional judgment (GPJ) expert testimony 
in the context of future dangerousness and civil commitment (Lieberman, et al., 2007).  
In that study, researchers found that perceptions of clinical opinion and GPJ testimony 
generally did not differ.3  Considering the importance of determining the most efficient 
form of expert testimony in civil-commitment hearings of SVPs, more research needs to 
be conducted in this area.  That said, the current study examines the influence of 
differing types of expert testimony4 on perceptions of future dangerousness and need 
for confinement in a SVP civil-commitment hearing in which the defendant is considered 
a moderate risk for recidivism amidst charges of voyeurism, sexual assault, and 
breaking and entering.  In addition, we were interested in the moderating effects of 
                                            
2 Differences reported by researchers as nearly significant: p = .08 (p. 31). 
3 Differences were observed as a function of cognitive processing mode (rational v. experiential). 
4 Modeled after Lieberman, et al., (2007)—clinical-opinion, actuarial assessment, and guided-professional 
judgment. 
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attributional complexity on perceptions of risk potential.  An empirical examination of the 
combined effects of different types of expert testimony and attributional complexity in 
this context has the potential to offer more specific insights into how individual 
differences in attributional schemata contribute to our understanding of perceptions of 
SVPs.  In view of the research demonstrating that individuals with complex attributional 
schemata are more efficient information processors than those with relatively simple 
schemata, we examined how individual differences in AC influenced participants’ use of 
expert testimony when evaluating the defendant as well as case facts.  Within this 
paradigm, we also varied victim type as female adult victim versus minor victim.  
Previous research examining the role of victim type in the context of a SVP trial found 
that, regardless of type of testimony, participants overwhelmingly decided in favor of 
commitment in the child-victim condition (Guy & Edens, 2006).  In light of this finding, 
the researchers suggest that future studies examine other aspects of a sexual-assault 
scenario (e.g., victim gender, level of seriousness of assault).  As a result, we decided 
to gauge level of seriousness of sexual assault by having the defendant hold the victim 
(adult and minor) at knifepoint.  Finally, we explored the role of participant gender 
considering the recent emergence of this variable as an important factor in studies 
examining perceptions of dangerousness (Foels & Reid, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006; 
2003; Lieberman et al., 2007).  
 
Accordingly, in a 2 (Victim Type: Adult v. Minor) x 3 (Expert Testimony: Structured-
Clinical Judgment v. Clinical v. Actuarial) between-subjects design, the current study 
investigated (1) participant-jurors’ preference for structured-clinical-judgment testimony 
over clinical opinion and actuarial testimony when determining need for treatment and 
future dangerousness in an SVP trial, (2) the moderating effects, if any, of attributional 
complexity on perceptions of the defendant, (3) the role of victim type in perceptions of 
the defendant, and (4) whether and to what extent gender differences exist in 
determinations of need for treatment and future dangerousness.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Two hundred forty-five undergraduate students participated as part of a course 
requirement or for extra credit (88 men, 157 women).  Participants were at least 18 
years of age, registered voters, and predominantly Caucasian (91%).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Pre-Trial Materials.  Prior to administering the stimulus materials, participants 
responded to items assessing basic demographic information (age, gender, class year, 
ethnicity, and jury eligibility).  In addition, they completed the 28-item Attributional 
Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986).  After completing these items, and prior to 
reading the expert testimony in the case, participants read one of two 400-word 
summaries describing events leading to the defendant’s arrest.  See Appendix for 
summary of case facts.  All participants then read a one-sentence explanation of state 
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law (Massachusetts) allowing for the confinement of sexually dangerous persons 
beyond their prison terms in a clinical institution.  
 
Trial Materials.  Participants then read one of three trial transcripts of the direct and 
cross-examination of expert testimony (clinical opinion v. structured-clinical judgment v. 
actuarial).  The following aspects of the expert testimony remained constant across all 
experimental scenarios: (1) expert’s background, experience, and education, (2) 
description of the offender as having a “moderate risk” of re-offending, and (3) 
discussion of the likelihood of the defendant re-offending and being a continuing danger 
to society.  
 
Structured-Clinical Judgment (SCJ).  In the structured-clinical-judgment condition, the 
expert utilized the SVR-20-R5 in characterizing the offender’s potential for future risk.  
The expert identified static factors including relationship problems, employment 
problems, and factors involving the defendant’s crimes.  Dynamic factors included 
interpersonal issues and sexual deviancy.  Clinical-risk factors included minimizing the 
consequences of his actions to the victim, lack of long-term plans, and resistance to 
treatment, also emphasizing that the presence of these factors increases the likelihood 
of recidivism.  In his testimony, the expert stated that he had reviewed the defendant’s 
criminal and medical records.  He also stated that he had held two two-hour interviews 
with the defendant at the prison 
 
Actuarial.  In the actuarial condition, the expert utilized the Static-20026 as the 
foundation for his opinion of the defendant.  He described the instrument as a reliable 
and valid measure assessing recidivism based on risk factors.  He indicated the 
defendant scored “4,” earning one point each for the following: conviction for a prior sex 
offense, non-contact prior sexual offense, breaking and entering during the crime, and 
assault on an unrelated victim, stating the defendant “has a 26% chance of recidivating 
in the next five years, increasing to 31% after ten years and 36% after fifteen years.”  
 
Clinical Opinion.  In the clinical-opinion condition, the expert relied on a series of 
interviews with the defendant.  The interviews consisted of discussion of the defendant’s 
social history, the events of the crimes, and his thoughts and feelings.  He discussed 
the defendant’s deviant sexual fantasies and attachments, stating that he specifically 
received and acted upon sexual thrills from stalking unsuspecting women.  The expert 
                                            
5 The SVR-20-R consists of a checklist of twenty items categorized as: psychosocial adjustment, sexual 
offenses and future plans. Each item is assessed on a 3-point scale from 0 to 2 (Boer, et al, 1997). 
6 The Static-2002 actuarial instrument (Hanson & Thornton, 2003) has recently replaced the widely 
accepted Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 1999). The goal of the revised scale was to develop a reliable 
assessment of risk in predicting sexual recidivism. The variables chosen for the scale were a function of 
factors associated with sex-offense recidivism presented in research findings (e.g., Hanson & Bussière, 
1998). The 13 items represent the following five categories: age at release, sex offense history, deviant 
sexual interests, availability of victims, general criminality with higher scores indicative of greater risk. 
Research with the Static-2002 has demonstrated moderate to high accuracy with respect to its predictive 
ability (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009). Research has also reported moderate-to-high interrater 
reliability (Langton, Barbaree, Hansen, Harkins, & Peacock, 2007).  
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also described the defendant as possessing poor skills in developing interpersonal 
relationships, showing little understanding for the assault on the victim, failing to 
appreciate the damage caused by such an attack, frequently finding excuses for his 
actions.  
 
Cross-examination.  The cross-examination by the defense attorney illustrated the 
common drawbacks of each type of testimony.  Specifically, in the cross-examination of 
actuarial testimony, the expert was questioned on the predictive ability of the Static-
2002 with respect to re-offending and the instrument’s inability to consider specific 
dynamic factors related to recidivism.  In the cross-examination of the structured-
clinical-opinion testimony, the expert was questioned on several factors related to 
psychosocial behaviors and sexual offenses not present in the defendant (e.g., mental 
illness, suicidal and/or homicidal tendencies, anti-social behavior, substance abuse 
problems).  Other factors included multiple victims, violence, and increase of frequency 
and severity of sex offenses.  Finally, the cross-examination of the clinical-opinion 
expert questioned the prediction accuracy considering the relatively few interviews 
conducted with the defendant.  
 
Transcripts ranged in length from 1,200 to 1,400 words, depending on testimony.  After 
reading the requisite testimony, all participants read the following definition of Sexually 
Dangerous Persons taken from the Massachusetts statute: 
 
Sexually dangerous person—any person who has been (i) convicted of or 
adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a 
sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not 
confined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was 
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes such person likely to 
engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) 
previously adjudicated as such by a court of the Commonwealth and 
whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to 
control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive 
sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression 
against any victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result, is likely 
to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his 
uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires (Mass. Gen Law., Title 17, Chap 
123. Section 1). 
 
Post-Trial Materials.  At the completion of the trial stage, participants completed two 
primary items of interest: The first item measured participants’ belief that the defendant 
should be placed in a clinical facility after serving his sentence.  The second measured 
participants’ belief that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society.  In 
addition, participants responded to a series of items designed to assess the perceptions 
of expert testimony, case facts, the role of treatment in re-offending, and defendant 
characteristics.  
Future Dangerousness  
OAJFP – SSN 1948-5115 – Volume 5. 2013 
64 
 
Items.  Unless otherwise indicated, all items were measured using a 6-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (completely).  Following are the two items measur-
ing perceptions of need for confinement and future dangerousness: “Do you believe that 
the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility after his sentence is served?”  “Do 
you believe that the defendant will be a continuing threat to society?”  Additional items 
in our analyses included: “If the defendant does/does not participate in treatment, how 
likely is it that he will commit a sexual crime in the future?”  “How much of your opinion 
on Mr. Cooke’s sexual-risk potential was influenced by the expert?”  “How credible was 
the expert?” 
 
After signing the consent form, participants were randomly assigned to one of six exper-
imental scenarios.  They then completed the pre-trial instruments, read the state statute 
defining sexually dangerous persons and expert testimony, and completed all depend-
ent measures.  Participation required 20 minutes.  
 
Results 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample on all dependent measures.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive data on all dependent measures  
 
Item Mean SD 
   
The defendant should be placed in a clinical facility 4.96 .98 
The defendant is a continuing threat to society.a 4.75 .92 
Likelihood of committing a sexual crime without treatment 5.02 .93 
Likelihood of committing a sexual crime with treatment 3.33 1.06 
Rating of expert credibility 4.93 .93 
Opinion of sexual risk potential influenced by expert testimony 4.22 1.06 
Opinion of sexual risk potential influenced by case facts 4.88 .84 
 
Note: N = 245 
aThis item’s responses ranged from 2 to 6.  Remaining items ranged from 1 to 6. 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
Two separate Chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the distribution of male 
and female participants among our treatment conditions.  No significant associations 
were found between gender and expert testimony conditions: χ2(2, N = 245) = .64, p = 
.73, Cramer’s V = .05; and gender and victim type: χ2(1, N = 245) = .31, p = .57, phi = -
.04.  According to these results, gender distribution among our experimental conditions 
appeared to be equivalent. 
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Attributional Complexity Scale Analysis 
 
After recoding, internal consistency of the 28-item ACS revealed Cronbach’s alpha = 
.90.  Individual item responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Aggregate responses to the 28-item ACS ranged from 82 – 167, M = 126.63, Md = 
126.00, SD = 16.14.  Based on a median split, and in order to examine this factor as a 
moderator, we dichotomized responses into low AC (82 – 126) and high AC (127 – 
167).  Low AC participants composed 51% of our sample (N = 124); high AC 
participants composed 49% of our sample (N = 121).  Consistent with research 
(Fletcher et al., 1986; Foels & Reid, 2010) females (M = 129.11, SD = 15.12) were 
significantly more attributionally complex than males (M = 121.92, SD = 17.09): t(243) = 
-3.46, p = .001.  See Table 2 for the 28-item ACS.  
 
Table 2 
Mean Responses to ACS items 
 
Item Mean SD 
   
I don’t usually bother to analyze and explain people’s behavior. 4.79 1.02 
Once I have figured out a single cause for a person’s behavior I don’t 
usually go any further. 
4.29 1.22 
I believe it is important to analyze and understand our own thinking 
process. 
5.06 .927 
I think a lot about the influence that I have on other people’s behavior. 4.46 1.00 
I have found that relationships between a person’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
character traits are usually simple and straightforward. 
4.46 1.00 
I see people behaving in a really strange or unusual manner, I usually put 
it down to the fact that they are strange or unusual people and don’t 
bother to explain it any further. 
4.59 1.21 
I have thought a lot about the family background and personal history of 
people who are close to me, in order to understand why they are the sort 
of people they are. 
4.48 1.19 
I don’t enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people’s 
behavior are discussed. 
4.45 1.28 
I have found that the causes for people’s behavior are usually complex 
rather than simple. 
4.93 .991 
I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works when I 
make judgments about people or attach causes to their behavior. 
4.79 1.09 
I think very little about the different ways that people influence each other. 4.72 1.06 
To understand a person’s personality/behavior I have found it is important 
to know how that person’s attitudes, beliefs, and character traits fit 
together. 
4.70 .931 
When I try to explain other people’s behavior I concentrate on the other 
person and don’t worry too much about all the existing external factors 
that might be affecting them. 
4.52 1.08 
I have often found that the basic cause for a person’s behavior is located 
far back in time. 
3.67 1.19 
I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for people’s behavior. 4.22 1.28 
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I find that complicated explanations for people’s behavior are confusing 
rather than helpful. 
4.07 1.15 
I give little thought to how my thinking works in the process of 
understanding or explaining people’s behavior. 
4.40 1.16 
I think very little about the influence that other people have on my 
behavior. 
4.64 1.14 
I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of my personality 
influence other parts. 
4.41 1.07 
I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people. 4.85 1.00 
When I analyze a person’s behavior I often find the causes form a chain 
that goes back in time, sometimes for years. 
4.18 1.15 
I am not really curious about human behavior. 4.87 1.35 
I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people’s behavior. 4.09 1.32 
When the reasons I give for my own behavior are different from someone 
else’s, this often makes me think about the thinking processes that lead to 
my explanations. 
4.15 1.08 
I believe that to understand a person you need to understand the people 
who that person has close contact with. 
4.59 1.00 
I tend to take people’s behavior at face value and not worry about the 
inner causes for their behavior (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, etc.). 
4.70 1.05 
I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behavior and 
personality. 
4.55 1.03 
I have thought very little about my own family background and personal 
history in order to understand why I am the sort of person I am. 
4.88 1.22 
 
Note: N = 245.  Responses scaled from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). 
 
Two separate Chi-square analyses were conducted to examine the distribution of high 
and low AC participants among our treatment conditions.  No significant associations 
were found between AC and expert-testimony conditions: χ2(2, N = 245) = 2.54, p = .28, 
Cramer’s V = .10; and AC and victim type: χ2(1, N = 245) = .19, p = .65, phi = -.03.  
According to these results, the distribution of high and low AC participants among our 
experimental conditions appeared to be equivalent. 
 
Need for commitment.  We tested the influence of our manipulated factors as well as 
AC on evaluations of need for commitment and determination of future dangerousness 
through two separate three-way ANOVAs—expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. 
Actuarial v. Structured-Clinical Judgment - SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC 
(Low v. High).  On evaluations of need for commitment, a significant testimony x victim-
type interaction was found: F(2, 233) = 6.82, p = .001, hp2= .05.  Participants were most 
likely to believe the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility in the clinical-opinion 
testimony/adult victim condition.  Alternatively, they were least likely to believe the 
defendant should be placed in a facility in the actuarial testimony/adult victim condition.  
See Figure 1 for graphic explanation of this finding.  In addition, a main effect for type of 
testimony was observed: F(2, 233) = 5.47, p = .005, hp2= .04.  Participants in the 
clinical-opinion-testimony condition were significantly more likely to believe the 
defendant should be placed in a clinical facility compared to the actuarial-testimony 
condition (Clinical: M = 5.25, SD = .79 v. Actuarial: M = 4.75, SD = 1.15).  SCJ 
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testimony did not differ significantly from either of these conditions (M = 4.93, SD = .91).  
We did not observe a main effect for type of victim on perceptions of need for 
commitment nor did we find any significant effects of AC on this item. 
 
Figure 1: Expert Testimony x Victim Type Interaction on Perceptions of Need for 
Commitment 
 
 
Future dangerousness.  A second three-way ANOVA was conducted on participants’ 
evaluations of the defendant as a continued threat to society: Expert Testimony (Clinical 
Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High).  A main 
effect of type of testimony was found: F(2, 233) = 10.41, p< .001, h2= .08.  Clinical-
opinion and SCJ testimony differed significantly from actuarial instruments when 
assessing continued threat.  Scheffé’s test of multiple comparisons revealed the 
following: Clinical Opinion (M = 5.06, SD = .75) SCJ (M = 4.78, SD = .91) v. Actuarial (M 
= 4.42, SD = .97).  Participants did not differentiate between clinical-opinion testimony 
and SCJ with respect to their effectiveness in assessing the defendant as a continued 
threat, thus perceiving them as equally influential in their evaluation.  No other 
significant effects were observed.  
 
Influence of Expert on Risk Potential for Sexually Violent Crime 
 
Influence of expert testimony.  In order to test the moderating effects of attributional 
complexity on our risk-potential items, we performed two separate three-way 
ANCOVAs: Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult 
v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High).  Our continuous measurement variables of future 
dangerousness and need for commitment were selected as covariates.  Preliminary 
analysis revealed non-significant effects of our moderator variable AC on each of these 
items: p values = .29 and .45 (two-tailed independent samples t-tests), demonstrating 
the suitability of this analysis for our purposes.  Results of the first ANCOVA indicated a 
significant expert testimony x AC interaction on the item: “How much of your opinion on 
Mr. Cooke’s sexual-risk potential was influenced by the expert?”  F(2, 231) = 4.62, p = 
.011, hp2 = .04.  High AC participants in the clinical-opinion-testimony condition relied 
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the least on expert testimony when evaluating the defendant’s sexual-risk potential and 
the most in the SCJ condition.  Alternatively, when evaluating the defendant’s sexual-
risk potential, low AC participants relied most on clinical-opinion testimony and least on 
actuarial testimony.  Figure 2 displays this interaction effect.  
 
Figure 2: Expert Testimony x Attributional Complexity (AC) Interaction on Expert 
Influence 
 
 
A main effect of testimony was also found on this item: F(2, 231) = 5.69, hp2 = .05.  Post 
hoc comparisons revealed participant-jurors exposed to SCJ testimony indicated that 
their opinion regarding risk potential was greatly influenced by the expert (M = 4.52, SD 
= .97).  This differed significantly from the actuarial condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.19).  
Clinical-opinion testimony did not differ from either SCJ or actuarial (M = 4.17, SD = .89)  
 
Recidivism Items 
 
We assessed participants’ perceptions of the likelihood of recidivism through two 
separate items: “If the defendant does/does not participate in treatment, how likely is it 
that he will commit a sexual crime in the future?”  Based on the bivariate correlation r = 
.41, p< .001, (one-tailed) we performed a MANOVA.  The resulting Expert Testimony 
(Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x AC (Low v. High) 
MANOVA found a significant effect of testimony on each item: Wilks’ Lambda = .858: 
F(4, 464) = 9.26, p < .001.  For the likelihood of recidivism with treatment, tests of 
between-subjects effects revealed participants were least likely to believe the defendant 
would commit a sexual crime in the future with treatment in Actuarial condition (M = 
2.85, SD = 1.10).  This differed significantly from both Clinical-Opinion (M = 3.59, SD = 
.91) and SCJ testimony (M = 3.617, SD = .93).  For the likelihood of recidivism without 
treatment, participants were least likely to believe the defendant would a commit a 
sexual crime in the future without treatment in the Actuarial condition (M = 4.79, SD = 
1.11).  This differed significantly from Clinical Opinion (M = 5.32, SD = 1.21).  SCJ did 
not differ from either condition.  
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Expert Credibility  
 
An Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) 
x AC (Low v. High) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ ratings of expert credibility.  
We found a victim type x AC interaction approaching significance: F(1, 233) = 3.43, p = 
.065, hp2 = .01.  Inspection of the means reveals high AC participants rated the expert 
as more credible in the child condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1.01) compared to low AC 
participants (M = 4.61, SD = .91).  However, for both high and low AC participants these 
ratings were lower than the Adult condition: high AC (Adult: M = 5.02, SD = .98), low AC 
participants: (Adult: M = 5.08, SD = .96).  Figure 3 displays this interaction finding. 
 
Figure 3: Victim Type x Attributional Complexity (AC) Interaction on Expert Credibility 
 
p = .065 
 
The main effect of victim type reveals higher ratings of expert credibility in the adult 
condition than in the child condition: F(1, 233) = 4.62, p = .033, hp2 = .02: (M = 5.05, SD 
= .91 v. M = 4.80, SD = .93, respectively).  The main effect of testimony was marginally 
significant: F(2, 233) = 2.85, p = .059, hp2 = .01.  This result was not strong enough to 
distinguish any statistically significant between-group differences in post-hoc analysis, 
however SCJ expert ratings were the highest (M = 5.13), Clinical Opinion (M = 4.84) 
and Actuarial (M = 4.81). 
 
Gender Effects 
 
To test whether participant gender influenced responses to our dependent measures, 
two three-way ANOVAs were conducted: Expert Testimony (Clinical Opinion v. Actuarial 
v. SCJ) x Victim Type (Adult v. Minor) x Gender (Male v. Female).  A main effect of 
gender was found on the belief that the defendant should be placed in a clinical facility: 
F(1, 233) = 6.38, p = .012, hp2 = .03.  Females were significantly more likely to believe 
the defendant should be committed than males were: (M = 5.06, SD = .94 v. M = 4.73, 
SD = 1.04, respectively).  Similarly, females were significantly more likely to view the 
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defendant as a continued threat to society than males were: F(1, 233) = 9.13, p = .003, 
hp2 = .04: (M = 4.87, SD = .83 v. M = 4.50, SD = 1.03, respectively).  No gender effects 
were observed on our dependent measures of expert credibility, likelihood of re-
offending with/without treatment, and opinion of sexual-risk potential influenced by 
expert testimony.  
 
Discussion 
 
The goal of the current study was to examine the effect of expert testimony, attributional 
complexity, and victim type on perceptions of dangerousness and need for commitment 
in the context of an SVP trial.  Considering the importance of determining the most 
efficient form of expert testimony in this context, we felt it was essential to add to the 
literature comparing structured-clinical-judgment testimony (SCJ) to both actuarial and 
clinical-opinion testimony.  In addition, in view of the research demonstrating that 
individuals with complex attributional schemata are more efficient information 
processors than are those with relatively simple schemata, we expected to observe 
differences in participants’ use of expert testimony as a function of attributional 
complexity.  If so, this result could add to the discussion of the importance of assessing 
information processing in SVP hearings (see Lieberman et al., 2007).  Our decision to 
examine victim type was largely based on the relatively few studies investigating this 
factor in the context of an SVP trial (e.g., Guy & Edens, 2006).  By gauging the level of 
seriousness of sexual assault on an adult versus a minor victim, we expected to 
observe differences in perceptions of dangerousness and need for commitment.  
Finally, we investigated the moderating effects of participant gender in considering the 
recent emergence of this factor as critical in understanding perceptions of 
dangerousness (Foels & Reid, 2010; Guy & Edens, 2006; 2003; Lieberman et al., 
2007).  
 
Overall, our participants did not indicate a strong preference for structured-clinical 
judgment (SCJ) testimony over clinical-opinion and actuarial testimony when evaluating 
need for commitment and future dangerousness.  Specifically, participants perceived 
clinical-opinion testimony and SCJ testimony as equally influential when assessing 
future dangerousness.  This finding supports Lieberman et al., (2007), who found no 
significant differences in dangerousness ratings between clinical testimony and guided-
professional-judgment testimony regardless of individuals’ processing mode.  Similar to 
dangerousness findings, in the current study, SCJ testimony did not differ from either 
clinical or actuarial testimony on perceptions of need for commitment.  However, victim 
type appeared to moderate the relation between expert testimony and perceptions of 
need for commitment.  Participants were most likely to believe the defendant should be 
placed in a clinical facility in the clinical-opinion testimony and least likely to believe the 
defendant should be placed in a facility in the actuarial testimony but only when the 
victim was an adult.  We also found that participants did not distinguish between clinical 
and SCJ testimony when evaluating the defendant’s sexual-risk potential, rating each as 
equally influential.  Finally, we did not observe the same type of overwhelming response 
to need for commitment when the victim was a child that was demonstrated by Guy and 
Edens (2006).  In this study, participants were exposed to two sexual-assault scenarios 
Future Dangerousness  
OAJFP – SSN 1948-5115 – Volume 5. 2013 
71 
involving a child.  This may have increased the likelihood that participants would 
respond in such an intense manner.  In our study, participants were exposed to one of 
two sexual-assault scenarios in which the victim was either an adult or minor, thus 
providing one explanation for the differences in victim type. 
 
The effects of SCJ testimony were less ambiguous however, when examining the 
moderating effects of attributional complexity.  When evaluating the extent to which 
participants relied on expert testimony in determining a defendant’s sexual-risk 
potential, high AC participants in the clinical-opinion testimony condition reported the 
least reliance on expert testimony and the greatest reliance in the SCJ condition.  
Alternatively, low AC participants relied the most on clinical-opinion testimony and least 
on actuarial testimony.  It is interesting that we found that high AC participants’ opinions 
of the defendant’s sexual-risk potential were less influenced by the case facts when 
exposed to clinical-opinion testimony and most influenced when exposed to actuarial 
testimony.  Low AC participants exposed to clinical testimony reported their opinion of 
risk potential was greatly influenced by the facts of the case and least influenced by 
SCJ testimony.  It appears that, for high AC participants, the data-driven testimony was 
found to be more useful when determining sexual-risk potential.  This result supports 
researchers who find that attributionally complex individuals not only seek out but also 
apply more useful information when determining causal attributions than attributionally 
simple individuals do (Murphy, 1994).  Overall, these findings provide support for the 
moderating effects of AC in the context of an SVP hearing and offer insights into how 
individual differences in attributional schemata contribute to our understanding of 
perceptions of SVPs.  
 
Participants relied on actuarial testimony when evaluating the likelihood of recidivism, 
regardless of opportunity for treatment, thus indicating the importance of utilizing static 
factors in favor of intervening treatments when determining risk.  Considering that our 
sample consisted entirely of undergraduate students, this result mirrors Krauss and 
colleagues (2010) who found students were significantly more influenced by actuarial 
testimony than by clinical testimony.  The researchers attributed this to the rational 
cognitive processing style of students.  It is interesting that, in our study, actuarial 
testimony differed significantly from both clinical and SCJ testimony when evaluating the 
likelihood of committing a sexual crime in the future with treatment.  In addition, higher 
ratings of expert credibility were found in the adult condition than in the child condition.  
At first glance, this finding may seem counterintuitive; however, it may appear that, 
when offending against adults, we need to rely on experts to determine what is deviant.  
Alternatively, we may rely significantly less on expert testimony when determining 
deviant behavior against a child.  Finally, females were more likely to believe the 
defendant should be committed as well as a continued threat than were males, a 
modest result considering no gender effects were observed on our measures of expert 
credibility, likelihood of re-offending with/without treatment, and opinion of sexual-risk 
potential influenced by expert testimony.  Although this result mirrors Guy and Edens 
(2003) who found females significantly more likely to commit a defendant described as 
a psychopath than males were, more research is needed to examine gender differences 
in expert testimony regarding risk potential. 
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Limitations and Future Research  
 
In spite of our attempts to balance validity issues with implementing a tightly controlled 
research design, we recognize that the current study is limited with respect to specific 
validity issues.  To start, ecological validity is hampered by the use of written trial 
transcripts as stimulus materials as opposed to videotaped or live testimony.  In 
addition, although we attempted to provide consistency and strength among the expert-
testimony conditions, the potential exists for different expert testimony to influence our 
measures.  We also recognize the limitations to generalizability through the use of an 
undergraduate student sample.  Although our sample consisted of jury-eligible 
individuals, the use of a more representative sample of jury-eligible community 
members is preferred.  Finally, a more comprehensive examination of this topic would 
include a deliberation facet (Sommer, Horowitz, & Bourgeois, 2001; Stevenson, et al., 
2010).  In the present study, however, we attempted to minimize certain validity issues 
by including the definition of SVPs as listed in the Massachusetts statute.  In addition, 
we formed our expert-testimony conditions to include both direct and cross-examination 
of the expert.  Nevertheless, it is important to be cognizant of limitations when 
generalizing findings from simulated trial studies, such as the current study, to the more 
realistic aspects of jury trials. 
 
To our knowledge, only one study has empirically examined perceptions of the relative 
efficacy of clinical-opinion, actuarial, and structured-clinical-judgment (SCJ) expert 
testimony in the context of future dangerousness and civil commitment (Lieberman, et 
al., 2007).  In this vein, the current study offers important findings when evaluating the 
most influential form of expert testimony in civil-commitment hearings of SVPs.  Future 
studies addressing expert testimony in the context of SVP should continue to assess 
individual difference characteristics in light of our findings as well as the findings of other 
researchers (Krauss et al., 2004).  Considering the strong moderating effect of ACS, we 
suggest future research assess the seven specific constructs present in the 28-item 
measure of attributional complexity.  Finally, in the current study we assessed the 
defendant as a moderate risk.  We suggest that future studies vary risk for recidivism as 
well as the level of seriousness of sexual assault charges.  Overall, this study provides 
important evidence into how contextual as well as individual difference factors 
contribute to our understanding of SVPs. 
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Appendix 
 
Mr. Joseph Cooke is currently thirty-eight years old.  Joseph lived with his parents and 
brother in Arkham, Massachusetts and attended Arkham High School graduating in 
1988.  He moved out of his home at age 18.  Joseph worked at a local machine shop 
immediately out of high school and began living with his girlfriend Jessica Rojas.  He 
and Jessica continued living together for three years when, in 1991, they ended their 
relationship due to Joseph’s infidelity.  Joseph moved out of Jessica’s apartment and 
began renting his own apartment in town. 
 
In 1992, Joseph Cooke began working part time at the Gold’s Gym in Arkham.  Joseph 
was frequently disciplined at work for being lazy.  Several customers complained that 
Mr. Cooke was sneaking into the women’s locker room.  Gold’s Gym contacted the local 
Police Department, who investigated Mr. Cooke and arrested him on charges of 
voyeurism.  Mr. Cooke pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to two-year 
probation in 1993. 
 
In the summer of 1995, Joseph Cooke started working for Allied Landscaping.  In July, 
he started working on Lora Jacoby’s lawn.  Lora Jacoby, 30, lived with her 
sister/daughter Diane, 28/9, in her home.  During his time there, Mr. Cooke entered into 
the home several times for lunch breaks.  Mr. Cooke worked at the Jacoby home until 
August of 1995.  He later stated that he would return several times a week until the 
autumn of 1995 to watch Lora Jacoby and her sister. 
 
On the evening of October 14, 1995, at approximately 11:45 pm, Joseph Cooke 
returned to the Jacoby home.  Using a crowbar, Mr. Cooke entered through the kitchen 
door.  He went up the stairs to the second floor, where he entered the room of Diane.  
Once inside the room, Mr. Cooke showed Diane a knife and told her that he would not 
harm her if she remained quiet.  Mr. Cook then inserted his fingers into Diane’s vagina.  
Lora Jacoby, sleeping in her first floor bedroom, was not awakened by the assault. Mr. 
Cooke fled from the house through the kitchen door.  
 
The Arkham Police Department was able to obtain fingerprints from the kitchen door 
and the doorknob of Diane’s bedroom doors.  The fingerprints matched those taken of 
Joseph Cooke after his previous arrest.  Joseph Cooke was apprehended three days 
later.  He accepted a plea bargain and was convicted of two counts of sexual assault 
and breaking and entering.  Joseph Cooke was sentenced to twelve years in prison in 
1996.  
 
 
 
